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Abstract
We study with the help of experiments a two-player second-price all-pay auc-
tion. Such an auction describes e.g. the situation of a country where stabilisations
are achieved through tax increases that eliminate a budget deficit. If these tax in-
creases have distributional implications then stabilisation may be delayed (Alesina
and Drazen, 1991).
We find (1) under-dissipation and not over-dissipation of rents which is in con-
trast to other all-pay auction experiments. (2) Underdissipation decreases with
increasing cost of distortionary taxation and increases with bidding cost. (3) Bid-
ding is closer to the equilibrium on the individual than on the aggregate level. (4)
The speed of stabilisations is smaller than the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium and
reacts less sensitively to changes in the cost of distortionary taxation.
Keywords: War of attrition, all-pay auction, stabilisation, experiment
JEL classification C72, C92, D44, E62, H30
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is twofold. We want to understand a mechanism behind fiscal policy.
We do this by establishing a link to auction theory and to the experimental method. The
framework that we are studying, a two-player second-price all-pay auction, can be usefully
applied in many other situations which resemble a war of attrition.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) study the situation of a heterogeneous population which
is deadlocked and divided over the question who shall bear the burden of a stabilisation.
Examples they give are France, Germany and Italy after World War I. In these countries
it was clear after the war that a fiscal stabilisation was necessary and that the huge deficit
that the countries had accumulated during the war had to be reduced. However, different
parties favoured different solutions. Conservative parties preferred a solution where the
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stabilisation was financed with the help of proportional income taxes and indirect taxes.
Left wing parties preferred a solution where the stabilisation was financed with the help of
progressive income taxes and capital taxes. For years parties were struggling and waiting
for the other to concede and to bear the larger part of the burden of the stabilisation. A
driving force behind this struggle was the polarisation of the society, i.e. the impossibility
to find a symmetric solution for the conflict. One party would always bear only a small
share and the other a substantially larger share of the cost of the stabilisation.
In real life there may be other factors that influence political stabilisations. Within
the context of Alesina and Drazen (1991)’s model we will concentrate only on the time
consuming struggle over an unequal but necessary allocation of a burden and abstract
all other factors away. These kind of struggles are not restricted to stabilisation of fiscal
policy. Other examples include academics trying to allocate administrative duties in
endless committee meetings. Everybody knows that the duty has to be done by somebody.
Nobody enjoys sitting and waiting endlessly. Still, participants in these meetings often
try to hold out and wait for the others to give up first. Similar problems arise in lobbying,
rent-seeking, contests etc.
Technically the problem is a special case of an all-pay auction. An all-pay auction is
an institution where several bidders i choose bids or efforts bi at an individual cost ci(bi).
Different bidders may have different cost functions ci. The bidder with the highest bi wins
a prize, the others do not win anything, but still pay the cost of their effort. The winner
pays either the cost of his own effort (in a first-price all-pay auction) or the cost of the
effort of the second bidder (in a second-price all-pay auction).
In the stabilisation problem the effort would be the time that parties wait before they
concede and accept to bear the larger share of the cost of the stabilisation. The cost is
the burden of the distortionary tax that has to be payed before the stabilisation occurs.
The prize is obtained by the party who does not concede, thus, bearing only a smaller
part of the cost of the stabilisation while obtaining the full benefit.
Institutions: We distinguish three institutions of all-pay auctions. First-price, second-
price and stochastic all-pay auctions.
• In a first-price all-pay auction the highest bidder obtains the prize and each bidder
pays the own bid. A first-price all-pay auction is suited to model a situation like a
contest where participants simultaneously invest effort.
Since the highest bidder obtains the prize with certainty we also call this auction a
perfectly-discriminating auction1.
• In a second-price all-pay auction the highest bidder obtains the prize but pays only
the second highest bid. All other bidders pay their own bid. A second-price all-pay
auction is closer to a situation where participants may drop out one after the other,
until only one bidder remains. This last bidder would then be the winner of the
auction. We often call this situation a war of attrition.
Also the second-price all-pay auction is a perfectly-discriminating auction.
1In Krishna and Morgan (1997) only this case is called an all-pay auction.
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• In a stochastic all-pay auction all bidders pay their own bid, and the probability
of winning the item is proportional to the bid. This situation is often called rent-
seeking and has been studied first by Bishop, Canning, and Smith (1978) and Tullock
(1980)2.
The stabilisation problem described by Alesina and Drazen (1991) is a second-price all-
pay auction. As soon as one party concedes and accepts the burden of the higher tax the
problem is solved. The other party does not bear any further cost. Also some meetings of
academic committees look similar to second-price all-pay auctions. The group who holds
out longest wins, but spends only an epsilon more of their time than the others.
Information: An important ingredient of a model of stabilisation like the one of Alesina
and Drazen is uncertainty about the bidding cost of the opponent. While opponents are
waiting for a stabilisation they bear different cost. The cost is known to the individual
party, but the opponent only knows a distribution. More generally, in a war of attrition
waiting cost often differ among participants and are often not publicly known3.
Among the few experiments that are done with all-pay auctions, however, several
assume publicly known (and often identical) bidding cost for all participants (Potters,
de Vries, and van Winden 1998, Davis and Reilly 1998).
Prizes: So far we assumed that there is only one prize. Since among the few experi-
mental studies a substantial part concentrates on situations with more than one prize we
will briefly discuss these situations:
Equilibrium bidding functions for situations with more than one prize are derived
in Holt and Sherman (1982). The problem of the optimal allocation of several prizes
in contests is studied theoretically by Moldovanu and Sela (2001). Related experiments
have been done by Barut, Kovenock, and Noussair (2002) and Mu¨ller and Schotter (2003).
Barut, Kovenock, and Noussair (2002) study a situation where six bidders compete for
four prizes. Mu¨ller and Schotter (2003) are concerned with a problem where four bidders
compete for either one or two prizes.
The result of these experiments does not deviate much from experiments with all-
pay auctions with only one prize (Potters, de Vries, and van Winden 1998, Davis and
Reilly 1998). In particular Barut, Kovenock, and Noussair (2002) and Mu¨ller and Schotter
(2003) find also in their experiment that bids in the experiment are higher than they are
in the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium.
Plan of the paper: In the following we will concentrate on a war of attrition with a
single prize and only two bidders. That is sufficient to describe the stabilisation problem
studied by Alesina and Drazen.
From other experiments (Potters, de Vries, and van Winden 1998, Davis and Reilly
1998, Barut, Kovenock, and Noussair 2002, Mu¨ller and Schotter 2003) we should ex-
2In the formulation of Tullock first-price all-pay auctions actually are a special case.
3A theoretical analysis of this case and a comparison of the revenue of different auction formats can
be found in Krishna and Morgan (1997).
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pect that bids are higher in the laboratory than they are in the risk neutral Bayesian
equilibrium.
From Mu¨ller and Schotter’s findings we should expect discontinuous individual bidding
functions and what Mu¨ller and Schotter call a ‘bifurcation of effort’, a step-shaped bidding
function where bidders with a high cost make small or no bids at all while bidders with
a small cost bid too much.
From the theoretical analysis of Alesina and Drazen (1991) we should expect that with
increasing cost of distortionary taxation the waiting time decreases.
We will proceed as follows: In the next section we will briefly summarise Alesina
and Drazen’s model. In section 3 we explain how and why we adapt this model to the
laboratory, we derive the equilibrium bidding functions, and we describe the experimental
procedures. Sections 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Stabilisation and the war of attrition in the model
of Alesina and Drazen
In the Alesina and Drazen model before the stabilisation takes place a fraction γ of
government expenditure g0 is covered by distortionary taxation τ , and a fraction 1− γ is
financed through debt. All payoffs are discounted with a constant interest rate r.
The tax τ is assumed to be distortionary. The utility loss from distortionary taxes for
each party i is Ki(t) = θiτ(t). The factor θi is known to members of group i but not to
members of the other group. The latter only know the distribution f(θ) with support on
[θ, θ¯]. Neglecting the (constant) income, and assuming the tax to be constant over time
τ(t) = γg0 the utility of group i in each period before the stabilisation takes place is
ui = −γg0
(
θi +
1
2
)
(1)
A stabilisation takes place as soon as one party concedes, i.e., agrees to pay a share
α > 1/2 of the cost of the stabilisation through a non-distortionary tax. The value α is
exogenously given and describes the polarisation of the society. If stabilisation occurs at
date T then life time utility of the winner W and of the loser L is given by
U j(T ) =
∫ T
0
uje
−rxdx + e−rT V j(T ) with j ∈ {W, L} (2)
V j(T ) are discounted lifetime utilities after the stabilisation took place:
V L = −αg0
r
V W = −(1− α)g0
r
(3)
where the winner and the looser are denoted with a superscript W and L. Each party
chooses T (θ) before the game. Alesina and Drazen find that equilibrium bids fulfil the
condition
γ(θ +
1
2
− α) = −f(θ)(2α− 1)
F (θ)T ′(θ)r
(4)
with T (θ¯) = 0.
Alesina and Drazen derive a couple of conclusions from their analysis.
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• The higher the utility loss or cost of distortionary taxation (measured as γ), the
earlier the stabilisation takes place.
• The larger the polarisation of the society (measured as α) the later is the expected
date of the stabilisation.
• A larger inequality in income need not lead to a quicker stabilisation. Actually, a
mean preserving spread of the distribution of income may delay stabilisation.
In our experiment we will concentrate on the first effect and study the impact of γ on
the timing.
3 Implementation of the model in the experiment
3.1 The model
In our experiment we study a special and slightly simplified case of Alesina and Drazen’s
model.
• The parameter θi that describes how the utility losses of distortionary taxation are
experienced by group i is drawn from a uniform distribution over [θ, θ¯] where θ¯ = 3θ.
• The interest rate r is zero, and different utilities for the two groups after stabilisation
are enjoyed only for a finite number of periods.
While the first assumption is just a choice of parameters that tries to keep the exper-
iment simple, the second assumption deserves more discussion.
In Alesina and Drazen’s model past payoffs or debt bear an interest r > 0. Future
payoffs or debt are discounted with the same parameter. Such a discount factor would
make the payoffs in the experiment difficult to describe to the participants. A constant
payoff or cost in each step of the bidding process makes the experiment much easier to
understand. We choose, therefore, r = 0. This, however, leads to a problem. If r = 0,
and if benefits of stabilisation are enjoyed for an infinite number of periods (as they are
in the original model), utility of stabilisation is infinitely high. We, thus, have to deviate
from Alesina and Drazen’s model and assume that benefits of stabilisation last only for a
limited number of A periods.
Hence, the life time utility of the looser and the winner from the date of stabilisation
T onward is
U j(T ) = Tuj + V
j(T ) with j ∈ {W, L} (5)
with utilities for the looser L and the winner W after the stabilisation are
V L = −Aαg0 V W = −A(1− α)g0 (6)
Denoting the distribution and density function of the choice of T of the opposing party
with H(T (θ)) and h(T (θ)), and writing F (θ) = 1 − H(T (θ)) we obtain the expected
utility
EU(θˆ) = F (θˆ)Tui +
∫ Ti
0
V W (T )− V L(T ) dT (7)
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With the difference V W (T )− V L(T ) then
V W (T )− V L(T ) = (2α− 1)g0A (8)
and from the first order condition we derive the following condition to hold in equilibrium
− f(θ)
F (θ)
1
T ′(θ)
(2α− 1)A = γ
(
1
2
+ θ
)
(9)
where the left expression denotes the expected gain from waiting another instant to con-
cede while the expression on the right is the associated cost.
With θ being uniformly distributed over [θ, θ¯] this expression can be solved for T ′(θ)
to yield
T ′(θ) = − 1
θ − θ ·
A(2α− 1)
γ
(
1
2
+ θ
) (10)
Integrating by partial fractions yields the equilibrium bidding function
T (θ) =
A(2 · α− 1)
γ · (1
2
+ θ)
(
ln
γ · (1
2
+ θ)
γ · (1
2
+ θ¯)
− ln θ − θ
θ¯ − θ
)
(11)
3.2 Experimental procedures
In the introduction we mentioned some experiments who study similar problems. We will
discuss our setup with the help of table 1.
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Davis and Reilly
(1998)
stochastic
and first-
price
sealed bid — 5 1 1 15 over-dissipation
Potters, de Vries,
and van Winden
(1998)
stochastic
and first-
price
sealed bid — 2 1 1 30
over-dissipation
only in the
stochastic case
Barut,
Kovenock, and
Noussair (2002)
first-price sealed bid valuation 6 2 or 4 1 20 or 50 over-dissipation
Mu¨ller and
Schotter (2003)
first-price sealed bid cost 4 2 1 50
over-dissipation,
bifurcation
our experiment
second-
price
ascending
clock
cost 2 1 6,1 24
under-dissipation,
no bifurcation
Table 1: Comparison with other experiments
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• Other experiments choose either a stochastic or a first-price all-pay auction. A
stochastic auction can be regarded as a model of lobbying, a first-price auction
represents a contest where players irrevocably invest effort before the game ends.
For the war of attrition that we want to study here, a second-price all-pay auction is
more appropriate. The winner waits only an epsilon longer than the second bidder.
• Other experiments choose a bidding process that uses sealed bids. This facilitates
the implementation in the laboratory. A technical disadvantage of an ascending
clock auction is the waiting time. If one group of bidders decides to make high bids,
all the other groups wait for this group.
Nevertheless, we find the explicit passing of time together with the visibly increasing
cost an essential ingredient of the war of attrition that we want to study. Theoreti-
cally the two processes might be similar, but behaviourally the difference might be
substantial.
Our choice to model the passing of time explicitely means that we have to normalise
time separately from payoffs in the experiment. We will explain in section 3.3 how
we deal with this issue.
• The next three assumptions are determined by the model that we want to study.
Uncertainty about opponents’ cost is essential for our equilibrium bidding function
and is, hence, reflected in the experiment. Consistent with the original model of
Alesina and Drazen we chose to have only two bidders. With two bidders there is
no reason to give more than one prize.
• A difficult choice is the number of repetitions in a group. The war of attrition
is typically seen as a one shot game. After the stabilisation has taken place the
world ends and the players will never interact again. Similar assumptions are made
in the reference models of other experiments. The obvious choice would be to
play a sequence of one shot games with random matching of players between each
round. We include, therefore, one treatment with random matching in our results
and will discuss this treatment in section 4.3. However, the larger part of the
paper discusses treatments with a larger number of repetitions. Choosing a larger
number of repetitions does not necessarily mean that we are not faithful to the
model. As long as the number of repetitions is common knowledge the repetition
of the equilibrium of the stage game in each stage of the repeated game is still an
equilibrium of the repeated game. However, this is not the main reason why we
decided to rematch players randomly only every six rounds.
An essential aspect of every experiment is that players have to find out what their
opponents are going to do and then determine what might be a best reply against
this behaviour. In some situations finding out what opponents do might be an
obvious task, in other situations it might be a challenge. Increasing the number of
repetitions means simplifying this task and also reducing frustration of participants
in the experiment.
Increasing the number of repetitions means also being faithful to the many appli-
cation of our problem. Groups are typically playing a war of attrition more than
7
once. The stabilisations after World War I were not the last ones in Europe. Re-
peated interaction might support collusive behaviour among the parties and should
be reflected in the experiment.
To better understand the impact of this assumption we will study in section 4.3 a
treatment where players are randomly rematched after each round.
Implementation The experiment was implemented with the help of the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher 1999) and carried out at the experimental laboratory of the SFB 504
at the University of Mannheim.
Groups of 10 to 14 participants would read instructions (see section B in the appendix),
answer computerised control questions to check whether they understood the experiment,
and would be matched randomly in pairs to bid for a prize. During the bidding process
participants see information similar to the following on the screen:
round: 2 of 24 remaining time [sec]: 2987
The value of the prize is 100
The cost of the other bidder is between 1.8 and 3.6 per second
Your cost is 3.59 per second
You are now bidding the following number of seconds for the prize: 4.00
You have, hence, bid the following amount this auction: 14.36
To leave the auction, press the bottom left button
I stop bidding
The number of seconds and the bid is updated every second. As soon as one bidder
stops bidding the other is declared winner of the auction. On the screen the participants
see information similar to the following.
round: 2 of 24 remaining time [sec]: 17
The other bidder has won the auction
auction your cost
per sec-
ond
other
bidder's
cost per
second
your cost
(total)
other
bidder's
cost
(total)
your
prot
in this
auction
new
balance
of your
account
2 3.59 2.91 14.36 11.64 -14.36 1876.54
To make sure that participants remain attentive they were asked to copy this information
manually to a table on their desk.
Participants play a sequence of six rounds with the same partner. Then they are
matched again randomly for another six rounds. This procedure is repeated for 24 rounds.
At the end of the experiment participants have to fill in a questionnaire, and receive their
earnings from the experiment in sealed envelopes. Each session lasts for about 75 minutes.
The initial endowment as well as the conversion rate in the experiment is given in table
2. The cumulative distribution of payoffs at the end of the experiment is shown in figure
1.
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of payoffs
3.3 Normalisations
If we translate the stabilisation problem into an all pay auction then, depending on the
parameterisation, prizes, bidding cost and the length of the auction may vary in a wide
range, a range too wide to be implemented in the laboratory. We therefore normalise prizes
and time. The prize (according to equation (8) will be normalised to a fixed number of
P units of the experimental currency (ECU).
P ECU = (2α− 1)g0A (12)
The length of a period will be normalised such that with equilibrium bids a constant
fraction σ of all auctions will last for s′ seconds or more. In our experiment we will have
P = 100 ECU, σ = 9/10, s′ = 2 seconds. We define
θσ = θ +
√
σ · (θ¯ − θ) (13)
and call s the length of one period in seconds. Then we require
s′ seconds = s · T (θσ) (14)
Now we can transform the values from the original model into values in the experiment
as follows: The cost per period is given by equation (1) to be ui = −γg0
(
θi +
1
2
)
. With
equations (12) and (14) this becomes the cost in ECU per second
c =
Pγ
(
θi +
1
2
)
(2α− 1)A
T (θσ)
2
ECU
second
(15)
using equation (11) and (13) this can also be expressed as
c =
P · (1 + 2θ)
s′γ(1 + 2θ)
ln
2(θ¯ − θ) + 1+2θ√
σ
1 + 2θ¯
ECU
second
(16)
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Substituting θ = θ and θ = θ¯ we find the minimal and maximal cost per second in the
experiment
cmin =
P
s′γ
ln
2(θ¯ − θ) + 1+2θ√
σ
1 + 2θ¯
cmax =
P (1 + θ¯)
s′γ(1 + θ)
ln
2(θ¯ − θ) + 1+2θ√
σ
1 + 2θ¯
(17)
In the experiment we will have to start with simple numbers for c and c¯ and then solve
for γ and θ¯ as a function of c, c¯, P, s′, σ and, actually θ:
γ =
P
s′c
ln

1− c
(
1 + 1√
σ
)
c¯

 θ¯ = c¯ · (1 + 2θ)
2c
− 1
2
(18)
Substituting into equation (11) allows us to describe equilibrium bids in seconds either as
a function of θ
tθ(θ) =
s′ ln
(θ¯−θ)( 12+θ)
(θ−θ)( 12+θ¯)
ln
2(θ¯−θ)+ 1+2θ√
σ
1+2θ¯
(19)
or as a function of c
tc(c) =
s′ ln c(c¯−c)
(c−c)c¯
ln
c¯+c
(
c
√
σ
−1
)
c¯
(20)
Choices of parameters in the experiment In all experiments we will have P = 100,
s′ = 2 and σ = 9
10
(i.e. the prize is always 100 ECU and 90% of all auctions should last
for more than 2 seconds in equilibrium).
We study four different sets of parameters. For three experiments we θ and θ¯ are keept
fixed and only γ is varied. In a fourth experiment we increase the ratio θ/θ¯. A list is
given in table 2. The parameters of the individual sessions are given in section A in the
appendix.
γ θ¯ c c¯ prize
repetitions
in a group
participants
.741305 1
2
+ 2θ 1.80 3.60 100 6 36
.606523 1
2
+ 2θ 2.20 4.40 100 6 46
.513211 1
2
+ 2θ 2.60 5.20 100 6 36
.898468 131
38
+ 150
19
θ 0.38 3.00 100 6 34
Table 2: Parameters for different treatments
10
4 Results
4.1 Bidding
We will start with the first conclusion that Alesina and Drazen drew from equation (4):
The higher the utility loss or cost of distortionary taxation (measured as γ), the earlier
the stabilisation takes place. Figure 2 shows how the winning bid (in periods) depends
on the parameter γ. The dashed three lines indicate the 40, 50, and 60% quantiles of the
equilibrium outcome, i.e. the equilibrium bid of the bidder who would, in equilibrium,
loose the auction. The three solid lines indicate the corresponding quantiles for the
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underbidding is persistent for all values of γ, but most noticeable when γ is small.
Figure 2: Median bids
experimental outcome, i.e. the period where the looser of the auction in the experiment
decided to leave the auction.
We see two things:
• Bids in the experiment are much lower than equilibrium bids.
• We do not find support for the predicted negative impact of γ on the stabilisation
time.
To facilitate the comparison of the first three treatments we will mainly refer to the
equilibrium bidding function t∗θ(θ) given in equation (19). This allows us to represent
bidding cost on a common scale from θ to θ¯ for these treatments.
In figure 3 we show the bids of the looser of the auction, i.e. the time that the bidder
who conceded first stayed in the auction. The left diagram in figure 3 shows bids in
seconds, the right diagram shows bids in periods, using the normalisation from equation
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of bidding time in seconds for different values of γ
(14). Let us start with the left diagram. The three curves with steps to the left are the
distributions of bids in our experiment for different γs, the three smooth curves to the
right are the theoretical distributions that we should expect if bidders would follow the
equilibrium bidding functions. In the right diagram we show the same distributions, now
not normalised to seconds, but in periods from the original model. We see that there is
serious underbidding. Bidders leave the auction earlier that they should in equilibrium.
The relative difference between equilibrium bids and bids in the experiment decreases
with increasing cost of distortionary taxation γ. To explore this phenomenon in more
detail we will look at estimates of bidding functions in the next section.
4.2 Comparison with equilibrium bids
We estimate an aggregate bidding function
b(θ, γ) = βtt
∗(θ, γ) + β0 + u (21)
and individual bidding functions for each bidder i
bi(θ, γ) = βt,it
∗(θ, γ) + β0,i + u (22)
If all bidders follow the equilibrium bidding function we should find βt = βt,i = 1 and
β0 = β0,i = 0 for all bidders i.
Since we can not observe bids of the winner of the auction we have to use an interval
regression (Tobin 1958, Amemiya 1973, Amemiya 1984). We assume that the winner of
the auction makes a bid that is bounded below by the looser’s bid which we can precisely
observe. Individual estimates of equation (22) are shown in figure 4.2. Table 3 shows
aggregate estimates βˆt and βˆ0 as well as medians and means of individual estimates βˆt,i
and βˆ0,i. The cumulative distribution of the individual estimates βˆt,i is shown in figure
12
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Figure 4: Individual estimates of equation (22)
aggregate individual aggregate individual
γ θ¯ c c¯ βˆt median(βˆt,i) mean βˆt,i βˆ0 median(βˆ0,i) mean βˆ0,i
.741305 1
2
+ 2θ 1.80 3.60 .2265084 .2895919 .4656144 40.52927 20.28199 107.4329
.606523 1
2
+ 2θ 2.20 4.40 .0935509 .208241 .3475332 42.65441 20.0824 95.75112
.513211 1
2
+ 2θ 2.60 5.20 .0137083 .0739829 .2263395 33.34752 18.40205 21.09349
.898468 131
38
+ 150
19
θ 0.38 3.00 .3741656 .5314418 .669349 39.1546 16.62696 25.02175
Since a small number of the individually estimated bidding functions show really large estimated param-
eters we show here medians and averages. The averages are shown only for completeness.
Table 3: Aggregate and individual estimates of equation (21)
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Figure 5: Cumulative distribution of bidding time in seconds for different values of γ
3. The straight lines in the figure show as a reference estimates of the aggregate bidding
parameter βˆt. Three points are worth noting:
• Similar to Mu¨ller and Schotter (2003) individual coefficients are significantly larger
than coefficients of the aggregate estimate.4 This might, however, be an artifact of
the specification of the model. In a linear model, where each individual has different
parameters, the approach that wrongly assumes this parameter to be constant across
individuals underestimates (other things equal) the parameter.
• Participants in our experiment react less sensitively to their bidding cost θ than
they should in the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium.5 This is in contrast to most
other experiments with all pay auctions.
• We find it interesting that with larger γ the sensitivity βt for θ decreases.6 This
means that the theoretical effect, that an increase in γ speeds up stabilisation, may
be weakened, if not reversed, as we have seen in figure 2.
Figure 6 supports this finding. Here we show on the vertical axis the median of the
estimated coefficient βt,i for different ranges of the bidding cost which is shown on
the horizontal axis. In addition to the three treatments that we discussed above
(which all have θ¯/θ = 3) the figure also shows the result of a treatment with a
higher value of γ and θ¯/θ = 14.9. As with the previous experiments we see again
that with a higher value of γ, i.e. with a lower range for bidding cost the amount of
underbidding decreases.
4Parametric test: t = 6.69, P>|t| = 0.000, nonparametric binomial test: P = 0.0000.
5Parametric F -test for the individual coefficients (allowing for correlations within sessions) F1,15 =
300.13, P>F = 0.0000, non-parametric binomial test P = 0.0000.
6Parametric t-test t = 5.65, P>|t| = 0.000, nonparametric Cuzick-Altman test z = 3.16, P>|z| = 0.00.
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The horizontal axis shows the interval for bidding cost [c, c¯]. The vertical axis shows median(βˆt,i) from
table 3 which should be 1.0 in equilibrium. We see that players bid less than in equilibrium. In particular
they deviate further from the equilibrium the higher their cost interval [c, c¯], and the lower the cost of
distortionary taxation γ for a given interval [θ, θ¯].
Figure 6: Underbidding depends on the cost of distortionary taxation and bidding cost
4.3 Collusion
In the previous sections we have seen that players bid less than they would bid in the risk
neutral Bayesian equilibrium. A possible explanation could be cooperative behaviour.
With a small number of players in a group (only two) and repeated interaction for six
periods in this group there is room for collusion. On the other hand it is not easy to
coordinate collusive efforts in this particular game. There will always be one winner and
one looser. The measure the degree of collusive behaviour due to the repetition we have
run one treatment where players are rematched after each auction (and not only every
six auctions as in all other treatments). Figure 7 compares the distribution of βˆt,i in a
treatment where players are repeatedly matched for six periods with a treatment where
players are randomly rematched after each interaction.7 We see that there is no difference
between the two treatments. In particular in both treatments most players have a βˆt,i < 1,
i.e. less than the equilibrium value.
4.4 Bifurcations
In their experiments Mu¨ller and Schotter (2003) observe what they call bifurcations of
bidding functions. If bidding is expensive, bidders underbid, if bidding is cheap, bidders
overbid. Moreover, for each bidder there is a threshold that determines when to switch
from under-bidding to over-bidding.
We want to find out whether this is a stable pattern that repeats in our experiment.
7We did this treatment only with parameters γ = .7766545, θ¯/θ = 3 and use only the corresponding
treatment with the same parameters (except for the rematching).
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The figure compares the distribution of βˆt,i in a treatment where players are repeatedly matched for six
periods with a treatment where players are randomly rematched after each interaction. In equilibrium
βˆt,i should be one in both treatments.
Figure 7: Collusion
To test this, we use a switching regression approach similar to Mu¨ller and Schotter:
bi(θ) =
{
βt,iθ + β0,i + u if θ ≤ θˆi
γt,iθ + γ0,i + u if θ > θˆi
(23)
For each individual i we estimate βˆt,i, βˆ0,i, γˆt,i, γˆ0,i with the help of an interval regression
(Tobin 1958, Amemiya 1973, Amemiya 1984) while choosing the θˆi such that the likelihood
ratio of the interval regression is maximised. Given that we have a smaller number of
observations per participant than Mu¨ller and Schotter (2003) and, furthermore, given
that the interval regression is numerically less stable than the OLS method that is used
by Mu¨ller and Schotter (2003)8 we could not estimate equation (23) for 16 of our 118
participants. In the following we concentrate on the 102 participants where equation (23)
could be estimated. Figure 8 show several examples for an individual bidding function.
The upper part of the figure shows bidding functions which correspond to the description
of Mu¨ller and Schotter. For low cost, the bidding is relatively high, at the threshold value
there is a drop to a segment that is lower. Other participants are described by bidding
functions like the ones in lower part of figure 8. They do not show a drop in the bidding
function at the threshold, but, instead, an increase. In figure 9 we show the cumulative
distribution of the step size, i.e., the difference
∆i = βˆt,iθˆi + βˆ0,i − (γˆt,iθˆi + γˆ0,i) (24)
This difference should be positive if participants have a bifurcated bidding function like
in Mu¨ller and Schotter. As we see in the figure, however, there is no clear trend. Only
about half of the ∆i are positive, the rest is negative. Hence, we find no support for
Mu¨ller and Schotter’s theory in our experiment.
8They can use this method since they have chosen to run the auction in a sealed bid format.
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Actual bidding is approximated with stepwise linear functions. Some bidding functions drop from the
left to right (as the ones in the top graph), but others have an increasing step (as the ones in the bottom
graph). The ones in the top graph are consistent with Mu¨ller and Schotter’s findings, the others are not.
Figure 8: Bifurcated bidding functions for 18 participants in our experiment
17
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n
−300 −200 −100 0 100 200
diff. left−right segment
 5 iterations
 25 iterations
The graph shows the cumulative distribution of the step size. Only positive step sizes are consistent with
Mu¨ller and Schotter. In the graph we see that about every second participant has a negative step size.
Figure 9: Bifurcation, the distribution of ∆i
4.5 Learning
To see whether players change their behaviour during the experiment we estimate equation
(21) for different points in time and for different values of γ. Figure 10 show the result.
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Figure 10: Development of βt (equation (21)) for different values of γ
There is no clearly visible trend. Also a censored regression that includes the period as
one parameter does not show a significant effect. To test this we regress the coefficients
on the period and find t = 0.98, P>|t| = 0.350.
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5 Concluding remarks
There are a couple of hypotheses that we can derive from the theory of Alesina and
Drazen and from other experiments (Potters, de Vries, and van Winden 1998, Davis and
Reilly 1998, Barut, Kovenock, and Noussair 2002, Mu¨ller and Schotter 2003) which we
all can compare with our setup. One of the basic properties of Alesina and Drazen can
be found in our experimental results. The higher the bidding cost θ, i.e. the individual
disutility from a distortionary taxation, the higher is the bid, i.e. the willingness to wait
for the other party to concede.
However, there are some significant deviations from the theory. Some of these devia-
tions are also not in line with what we should expect from other experiments. Consistently
other experiment with all pay auctions found bids that are higher in the laboratory than
they are in the risk neutral Bayesian equilibrium. This was not the case in our experi-
ment. Instead, bids in our experiment are significantly smaller. Why could this be the
case?
Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1998) develop a model of boundedly rational bidders
which explains over-dissipation of rents. One conclusion of their model is that if we find
over-dissipation then we should find more with a larger number of bidders. Indeed, we
have a smaller number of bidders in our experiment than the other experiments mentioned
above. Still, we find not only a smaller degree of over-dissipation, as would be consistent
with Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1998), but even under-dissipation.
From (Mu¨ller and Schotter 2003)’s findings we should expect discontinuous individual
bidding functions and what Mu¨ller and Schotter call a ‘bifurcation of effort’, i.e. a step
shaped bidding function where bidders with a high cost make small or no bids at all (these
are the ‘drop outs’ in Mu¨ller and Schotter’s story) while bidders with a small cost bid
too much (the ‘workaholics’). We did not find these types in our experiment. When we
introduce bidding functions that allow for steps we find steps going in all directions and
not predominantly decreasing steps that we should expect following Mu¨ller and Schotter.
Experiments are, however, not the only reference point. One starting point of this
project was the theoretical analysis of Alesina and Drazen (1991). As one result we
should expect with decreasing cost of distortionary taxation an increase in the waiting
time. In our experiments we have found that with a decreasing cost of distortionary
taxation γ bidders will increasingly shade their bids, which, in total seems to cancel the
effect from Alesina and Drazen.
While our study answers some questions it also opens a couple of new ones. We found
unexpected results and we haven’t yet been able to identify all causes. So far the number
of experiments with all-pay auctions and wars of attrition is small. The experiments that
we used for comparison differ in particular in the format and in the bidding procedure.
They are first-price or stochastic all-pay auctions while we look at second-price all-pay
auctions. They use a sealed-bid process to submit bids while we use an open-bid ascending
clock procedure. We would be surprised if it were really the format of the auction that
accounts for all the difference. It is rather the bidding mechanism that we consider to be
responsible for the differences in the results. Still, here we have to do more experiments.
Nevertheless, our experiment shows that it is possible to study stabilisation processes in
the lab and opens some room for further research.
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A List of experiments
Date γ c c¯ θ¯/θ re
p
et
it
io
n
s
in
a
gr
ou
p
periods participants
1. 20040116-10:39 .606523 2.2 4.4 3 6 18 10
2. 20040116-14:09 .606523 2.2 4.4 3 6 18 10
3. 20040120-10:31 .606523 2.2 4.4 3 6 24 14
4. 20040120-12:25 .606523 2.2 4.4 3 6 24 12
5. 20040120-13:57 .513211 2.6 5.2 3 6 24 12
6. 20040122-14:01 .513211 2.6 5.2 3 6 24 12
7. 20040122-15:53 .513211 2.6 5.2 3 6 24 12
8. 20040123-10:31 .741305 1.8 3.6 3 6 24 12
9. 20040123-12:19 .741305 1.8 3.6 3 6 24 12
10. 20040123-16:07 .741305 1.8 3.6 3 6 24 12
11. 20040219-10:31 .606523 2.2 4.4 3 1 24 12
12. 20040219-13:35 .606523 2.2 4.4 3 1 24 12
13. 20040219-15:49 .606523 2.2 4.4 3 1 24 12
14. 20040220-10:23 .898468 .38 3 14.91106 6 24 8
15. 20040220-12:25 .898468 .38 3 14.91106 6 24 12
16. 20040220-16:17 .898468 .38 3 14.91106 6 24 14
The experiment was carried out in the experimental laboratory of the SFB 504 at
the University of Mannheim. All sessions were done in german. In section B you find a
translation of the instructions.
B Instructions to the experiment
Welcome to a strategy experiment
This strategy experiment is financed by the University of Mannheim and the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). The instructions are easy when you read them carefully.
If you decide considerately and put yourself in the position of the other players you have
the opportunity to gain a considerable amount of money. You receive the money at the
end of the game. The profit is related to your performance during the game.
During the experiment you participate in an auction about prizes which are valued in
“Experimental Currency Units” (ECU). During the auction your bids are also in ECU.
At the end of the auction you will be paid in Euro. Thereby, 200 ECU equal 1 Euro. We
have already held experiments similar to this one. Due to our experience we expect an
average profit of 12 Euro, dependent on your strategy. We have no interest in paying you
less money than you are entitled to. The amount of money not used will be returned to
the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
During the experiment talking and communicating between the bidders is strongly
prohibited. Your are not allowed to take any notes, books, and cell phones into the
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experiment laboratory. Moreover, you are not allowed to start other programmes on the
computers. If you don’t follow the rules we have to exclude you from the experiment and
you won’t get any payment.
Instructions The auction is held between two bidders. The bidders are randomly and
anonymously assigned to each other. Each pair of bidders play 6 rounds together. Four
times during the experiment you get an new partner, randomly selected. In total you will
play 24 rounds, thereof 6 sequenced rounds with the same partner. One round corresponds
to one auction in which one prize is sold. The value of the auction prize is in all 24 rounds
and for all participants 100 ECU.
The proceeding of the auction is as follows: In every second, you and your partner
simultaneously pay a certain amount until one of the bidders is not willing to increase
her bid. In the beginning of each auction you will be informed of your bidding amount
per second which corresponds to the amount of ECU you bid every second. During each
round the bidding cost per second are constant. At the beginning of every round each
player randomly receives new bidding cost per second to participate in the auction of the
prize. The bidding cost per second for both players are continuously distributed between
1.80 and 3.60 ECU but you have no information about the exact bidding cost per second
of your partner.
round: 2 of 24 remaining time [sec]: 2987
The value of the prize is 100
The cost of the other bidder is between 1.8 and 3.6 per second
Your cost is 3.59 per second
You are now bidding the following number of seconds for the prize: 4.00
You have, hence, bid the following amount this auction: 14.34
To leave the auction, press the bottom left button
I stop bidding
Each period, the screen shows the value of the prize which is constantly 100 ECU.
Furthermore, the screen displays your bidding cost per second and reminds you that the
bidding cost per second is an amount between 1.80 and 3.60. In addition, you will be
informed about how many seconds you have already bid and what your total cost of the
current auction are. After 10 seconds a “Stop”-button with the title ”I stop bidding”
appears down right. You should use the countdown (10 seconds) to plan your optimal
bidding strategy. Press the “Stop”-button if you don’t want to proceed bidding and leave
the auction. As soon as you leave the auction your partner wins the prize. Likewise, you
win the prize if your partner leaves the auction earlier as you. As long as you don’t
press the “Stop”-button, your are still bidding for the prize. The auction ends
for both bidders as soon as the first bidder presses the “Stop”-button.
For every second you bid, you have to pay the bidding cost per second.
These cost occur independently of who (you or your partner) wins the auction.
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In the beginning of the experiment your account balance is 2300 ECU. Your cost will
be subtracted from the account balance. If you win the auction, the prize with the value
of 100 ECU will be credited to your account. Your account balance at the end of auction
is calculated as follows:
Account balance before the start of the auction
− (Number of bidding seconds) × (Bidding cost per second)
+ Value of the prize, if you win the auction
= Account balance after the auction
The account balance at the end of the auction is your account balance in the beginning
of the following auction. The account balance at the end of the 24th auction is your payoff
for the participation of the experiment. Thereby, you receive 1 Euro for 200 ECU.
At the end of each auction both players will be informed about their current account
balance and who has won the prize. Furthermore, each player gets the information about
the bidding cost per second of her partner in the previous auction.
During the experiment please fill in the table below at the end of each auction. So
you always know the bidding cost per second and the total cost of you and your partner.
Also, you have an overlook of your benefit and the development of your personal account
balance.
If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to rise your hand. We will be glad to
come to your seat and answer your questions.
Thank you very much for your participation!
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